



BUSINESS PLAN · INDIA

Turf & Sports Facility Business

A land-yield business sold by the hour, where the empty hours are the whole margin

SPORTS, FITNESS & RECREATION BUSINESSES

AISEVAK.IN · BY ABL DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES

August 2026

This document is confidential and prepared for planning purposes. All financial figures are illustrative model assumptions for an Indian MSME context and must be validated against live quotes, local rates and professional advice before any investment or borrowing decision.

1. Executive Summary

This plan sets out a **Turf & Sports Facility Business** in India — bookable artificial-turf pitches and courts sold by the hour to recreational players, with corporate leagues and tournaments, academy and school block hire, memberships, and food-and-beverage revenue alongside.

This is the pure capacity business of the vertical, and it owns nothing but hours. There is no coaching, no curriculum, no relationship and no product beyond the slot itself — **a seven o'clock Saturday pitch is a seven o'clock Saturday pitch, and the customer can get one from any facility within a fifteen-minute drive.** Everything in this plan therefore reduces to one question: **how many of the available hours are sold, and at what rate.**

It is also the most extreme peak/off-peak business in this library, which makes it the sharpest test of the convention the academy plan established. Demand concentrates almost entirely into **weekday evenings between seven and eleven, plus weekends** — roughly thirty-five hours out of a hundred operating hours a week. **Peak runs at 88% from the first month and cannot be grown; every point of margin improvement comes from hours nobody currently wants.** This plan therefore reports **off-peak utilisation rising from 14% to 46%** as its central operating number, with blended annual utilisation moving 34% → 61%, and the useful consequence is that **peak revenue falls as a share of total from 51% to 34% — not because peak weakened, but because the business finally grew somewhere else.**

The honest framing a promoter needs before anything else: these are real-estate economics wearing a sports badge. Land cost, rent or instalment, and utilisation are the only three variables that decide the outcome — **branding, community and coaching partnerships are decorations on a yield calculation.** The correct metric is **revenue per square foot per year (₹385 → ₹758)**, not bookings. And this produces the fact the Indian turf industry runs on and rarely states: **at market commercial rent in most metros, a turf simply does not work** — which is why so many operate on land the owner could not otherwise monetise, **beneath high-tension lines, on plots awaiting redevelopment, on temporarily unbuildable ground.** That is the actual business model, and its corollary must be planned for rather than discovered: **the land is cheap precisely because it will be taken back.**

This plan models a two-pitch facility requiring **₹1.35 crore** (₹58 lakh promoter + ₹62 lakh term loan + ₹15 lakh working-capital finance), moving from **₹1.88 crore revenue and ₹8 lakh profit** in Year 1 to **₹3.7 crore revenue and ₹88 lakh profit** by Year 3. (*Fixed-cost capacity business; utilisation-driven — figures illustrative.*)

2. Business Description, Vision & Legal Structure

Concept: A multi-sport turf facility — five-a-side and seven-a-side football pitches, cricket nets or box cricket, and hard courts — operating long hours with floodlighting, online booking, changing facilities, food and beverage, and structured league programming to fill weekday demand.

Vision: To be booked at eleven in the morning, not just at eight at night.

Mission: Sell the empty hours; keep peak direct; take payment before the slot; fund the resurfacing reserve every month; and never pretend the lease is longer than it is.

Legal structure options

- **Private Limited** — suits leases, equipment finance, corporate league contracting and multi-site plans.
- **LLP** — workable for a partner-run single site.

- **Proprietorship** — feasible for one small facility, though it weakens corporate contracting.

Regulatory anchor: the exposures here are municipal and neighbourly rather than sectoral — **there is no national standard for commercial sports facilities in India**, the fifth self-regulated business in this library. What binds: **land use and zoning permissions**, since a great deal of turf sits on land whose permitted use is not commercial recreation, and an operation running without that is exposed to closure rather than penalty; **municipal trade licence and building permissions** for structures, seating and F&B; **noise regulations and floodlight timing — the single most common cause of enforcement action against turfs**, since a facility generating shouting and stadium lighting until eleven at night in a residential neighbourhood accumulates complaints quickly; **FSSAI registration where food is served; public liability and personal-accident insurance, because turf injuries are frequent and surface condition is a foreseeable cause**; electrical safety certification for high-mast lighting; and fire and emergency-egress compliance for enclosed courts. **Lease documentation deserves particular care, since the improvements are immovable and the tenure is usually short.**

3. Promoter & Ownership

Led by a promoter with facility-operations, real-estate or sports-business background. Three competences decide outcomes: *land negotiation*, which sets the economics before a single slot is sold; *off-peak programming*, since that is where all incremental margin lives; and *operational reliability*, because the only thing distinguishing one turf from another is whether the lights work, the surface is sound and the booking holds. Site economics, utilisation, direct-booking share & maintenance discipline are the differentiators. Ownership, equity & any landowner revenue-share are editable inputs.

4. Market Analysis — India

Demand is driven by urban adults with no access to open ground, five-a-side football's growth, corporate team activity, box cricket's popularity, and the near-total disappearance of free playable space in Indian cities. Demand at peak substantially exceeds supply; demand off-peak barely exists and must be created. The market is **hyper-local, time-concentrated and undifferentiated**.

Demand drivers

- **Disappearance of free playing space** in urban India, which is what created this market entirely.
- **Five-a-side football and box cricket**, formats designed for exactly this footprint.
- **Corporate teams and leagues**, which book in blocks and pay reliably.
- **Floodlighting**, which makes post-work play possible and defines the peak window.
- **Recurring social groups** — the same eighteen people at the same slot every Wednesday, which is the most valuable customer this business has.

Market sizing (illustrative framing)

Layer	Definition	Indicative scale
TAM	Indian bookable sports-facility hours	Growing with urban density
SAM	Players within ~15 minutes' travel	Tightly bounded by drive time
SOM (Yr 1-3)	Slot-hours sold, peak and off-peak separately	Blended utilisation 34% → 61%

The land question decides this business before any operating decision is made, and it deserves to be stated without euphemism. A turf occupies a large footprint and generates modest revenue per square foot — **which means that at market commercial rent in a Mumbai, Bengaluru or Delhi location, the arithmetic simply does not close.** The facilities that work are almost always on **land that could not be monetised any other way:** plots beneath high-tension transmission corridors where construction is prohibited, land held for redevelopment where the owner wants interim income, low-lying or flood-prone ground, institutional land let out informally, or sites where litigation prevents building. **This is not a marginal observation — it is the structural basis of the Indian turf industry, and a promoter who has not understood it will underwrite a site that cannot pay for itself.** Two consequences follow and both belong in the plan rather than in hindsight. **First, tenure is short and precarious by design** — the land is affordable precisely because its owner expects to take it back, so **a five-year payback on a three-year lease is not a plan, it is a hope.** Second, **negotiate a revenue-share or a longer term with a break clause rather than the lowest rent,** because **the cheapest rent is usually attached to the least secure tenure, and the improvements do not travel.**

Target segments

- **Recurring recreational groups** — same slot, same players, weekly; the backbone of peak revenue.
- **Corporate teams and leagues**, block-booking and reliable.
- **Academies and coaching businesses** renting blocks — **notably, the academy's peak hours are the turf's peak hours, but its school-programme hours are the turf's dead ones.**
- **Schools**, filling weekday mornings exactly as they do for the academy.
- **Casual and one-off bookers**, largely platform-originated and price-led.

5. Competition & Competitive Advantage

Landscape: other turfs within the same drive-time, club and society facilities, school grounds hired out, **aggregator platforms that list every facility side by side**, and public grounds where available. **Competition is almost purely on location, price and availability, because the product itself is identical.**

The business's edge

- **Surface quality and maintenance**, which players notice immediately and which reduces injury.
- **Reliability** — lights that work, bookings that hold, a slot that starts on time.
- **Off-peak programming** that competitors leave empty.
- **Recurring-group management**, protecting the weekly slot that a group values above price.
- **Ancillary experience** — parking, changing rooms, seating and F&B, which decide the choice between two equidistant turfs.

Because the slot is a commodity, the only durable customer relationship in this business is the recurring group — and protecting it is worth more than any marketing. Eighteen colleagues who have played at eight on Wednesday for two years are **not price-sensitive, do not compare facilities, and will absorb a rate increase rather than reorganise their week;** the same eighteen people booking casually each week are entirely price-led. **The operational implication is that the recurring slot must be genuinely protected** — never released to a higher-paying one-off booking, never moved for a tournament, never lost to a platform's inventory system. Facilities lose these groups in exactly one way: **the group arrives to find their slot given away, and having been displaced once they book elsewhere permanently.** Growing recurring group bookings from 46 to 152 is the closest thing this business has to a retained customer base, and **the discipline that produces it is simply never taking the better offer for a slot that already belongs to someone.**

6. Revenue Model & the Platform Question

Line	Model	Basis
Peak-hour slot bookings	Per hour, premium rate	51% → 34% of revenue — capped
Off-peak slot bookings	Per hour, discounted	The growth engine
Corporate leagues & tournaments	Per event / season	Block demand; high value
Academy & school block hire	Contracted blocks	Fills the dead weekday hours
Memberships & season passes	Recurring	Locks the recurring group
F&B, equipment hire & ancillary	Per visit	Margin on existing footfall

Aggregator platforms present the disintermediation problem this library examined from the marketplace's side — and here the facility is the provider being intermediated, which changes the correct answer entirely. Platforms genuinely add value at off-peak: they reach casual players who would never have found the facility, and **an off-peak hour sold at a 20% commission is infinitely better than an off-peak hour sold to nobody**. At peak they add almost nothing: **the eight o'clock Saturday slot sells itself, and paying a platform 15-25% for a booking that would have happened anyway is pure margin donation**. The discipline this plan applies is therefore **asymmetric by design: platforms are used aggressively for off-peak inventory and withheld from peak**, with **direct-booking share of peak slots rising from 74% to 92%** and total aggregator commission falling from 5.8% to 3.7% of revenue *while platform-originated off-peak volume grows*. The failure mode to avoid is the convenient one — **listing all inventory because it is easier** — which trains regular customers to book through a platform that then owns the relationship and can raise its take at will.

7. Go-to-Market — Selling Hours Nobody Wants

Filling peak (easy)

- **Local visibility and word of mouth** within a fifteen-minute radius.
- **Recurring-group conversion** from casual bookings — the single highest-value action.
- **Corporate outreach** for weekly team slots and leagues.

Filling off-peak (the actual work)

- **School partnerships** for weekday mornings, the same mechanism the academy plan used.
- **Academy and coaching block hire**, since coaching businesses need ground and rarely own it.
- **Morning fitness, women's and senior groups**, whose available hours are precisely the dead ones.
- **Aggressive off-peak pricing and platform listing**, because at 14% utilisation almost any rate beats empty.

Sales approach

Fill peak locally → convert casual bookings into recurring slots → contract schools and academies into weekday mornings → use platforms only for residual off-peak → grow F&B on the footfall already present. **The pricing error to avoid is uniform hourly rates**. A facility charging the same for eleven on a Tuesday morning as for eight on a Saturday **will sell the Saturday and never the Tuesday**, because the off-peak buyer is entirely price-elastic and the peak buyer is not. **Steep off-peak discounting is not margin erosion — the marginal cost of an otherwise-empty hour is close to the electricity bill**, and an hour sold at 40% of peak rate contributes 40% more than an hour sold at nothing.

8. Operations Plan (book, collect, play, maintain, reserve)

- **Booking & scheduling:** online and direct, with **recurring slots ring-fenced and never reallocated.**
- **Payment:** **advance payment on booking, rising to 100%** — the only effective control on no-shows.
- **Slot operations:** on-time changeover, lighting control, equipment issue, attendant cover through the peak window.
- **Surface maintenance:** brushing, infill top-up, seam inspection, drainage clearing — **on a schedule, not on complaint.**
- **Resurfacing reserve:** **monthly accrual against a defined surface life**, funded rather than intended.
- **Neighbour management:** floodlight curfew, noise control, parking discipline, proactive resident contact.
- **Safety:** surface condition checks, first aid, injury recording, insurance currency.
- **Off-peak programming:** school and academy contracts, leagues, morning groups.

Slot economics chain

Stage	Activity	Control point
Price	Peak vs off-peak differentiated rates	Off-peak elasticity captured
Book	Direct at peak; platforms off-peak only	Direct peak share 74% → 92%
Collect	Advance payment	Advance 62% → 100%; no-shows 11.4% → 2.8%
Play	Attendant cover, lighting, changeover	On-time starts; surface injuries 9 → 3
Maintain	Scheduled care + resurfacing accrual	Reserve funded 100% of requirement
Fill	Schools, academies, leagues, mornings	Off-peak utilisation 14% → 46%

Two operational realities are routinely left out of turf business plans, and both are expensive. The first is that the surface is a consumable with a defined life. Artificial turf under Indian sun and heavy daily use lasts roughly five to eight years before infill degradation, fibre wear and seam failure make it both unpleasant and unsafe — and **replacement is a substantial capital event, not a repair.** A facility that does not accrue for it monthly is **reporting profits it will have to hand back**, and will face the choice between an unaffordable resurfacing and a deteriorating surface that drives players away and causes injuries. This plan therefore carries an explicit **resurfacing reserve funded at 100% of requirement**, treated as a cost of trading rather than an optional provision. **The second is the neighbours.** Floodlights and eighteen shouting adults until eleven at night, in what is usually a residential area, **generates complaints that escalate to the municipality — and noise and lighting enforcement is the commonest way turfs are shut down in India, ahead of every commercial cause.** A curfew observed voluntarily, directional lighting, parking discipline and a relationship with the local association cost very little; **reacting after the first notice costs the operating hours that make the business work.**

9. Land, Licensing & Liability (India)

- **Land use & zoning:** much turf sits on land whose permitted use is not commercial recreation — **an operation without that permission is exposed to closure rather than penalty.**
- **Lease documentation:** tenure, renewal, break clauses and treatment of immovable improvements — **the land is cheap precisely because the owner expects to take it back.**
- **Noise & floodlight regulation:** **the most common enforcement trigger against turfs;** curfews, directional lighting, and resident engagement.

- **Municipal trade licence and building permissions** for structures, seating and enclosures; fire and egress compliance for covered courts.
- **FSSAI registration** where food and beverages are served.
- **Public liability and personal-accident insurance** — **turf injuries are frequent, and worn surface, inadequate infill or a hard sub-base are foreseeable causes rather than accidents.**
- **Electrical safety certification** for high-mast floodlighting and its maintenance record.
- **No national standard exists for commercial sports facilities** — surface, run-off and safety specifications are self-imposed, the fifth such case in this library.

10. Organisation & Manpower Plan

Role	Yr 1	Yr 2	Yr 3
Promoter / facility manager	1	1	2
Facility attendants (shift cover, evening peak)	6	9	14
Ground & surface maintenance	4	6	9
Front office, bookings & scheduling	3	5	8
F&B staff	3	5	8
Security	3	4	6
League & tournament coordination	1	3	5
Admin & accounts	1	2	3
Total	22	35	55

Staffing is shaped by the peak window rather than by revenue — a facility needs attendants, security and F&B from six to eleven every evening whether or not the morning sold anything, which is why **filling off-peak adds revenue against a cost base already being paid for.**

11. Implementation Timeline & Milestones

Phase	Timeline	Milestone
Setup	Month 0-5	Lease, permissions, site development, surface installation, floodlighting, booking system
Launch	Month 5-12	Peak 88%, off-peak 14%; ₹1.88cr revenue, ₹8L profit
Fill	Year 2	Off-peak 29%, schools and academies contracted, no-shows 5.2%; ₹2.7cr, ₹44L profit
Optimise	Year 3	₹3.7cr, ₹88L profit; off-peak 46%, direct peak booking 92%, ₹758 per sq ft

12. Financial Plan (Illustrative)

*All figures are illustrative model assumptions for an Indian context, shown so the promoter can replace them with live rates. **Off-peak utilisation, direct-booking share of peak, advance payment and the resurfacing reserve are the levers — and revenue per square foot per year is the frame, because this is a land-yield business.***

12.1 Project cost & means of finance

Capital requirement	₹
Turf surface, sub-base & installation	52,00,000
Floodlighting, fencing & netting	24,00,000
Deposits & advance lease	22,00,000
Site development (drainage, levelling, access)	14,00,000
Changing rooms, seating & F&B setup	12,00,000
Working capital	6,00,000
Technology (booking system, access, lighting control)	3,00,000
Licences, insurance & launch	2,00,000
Total project cost	1,35,00,000
Promoter contribution	58,00,000
Term loan	62,00,000
Working-capital finance	15,00,000

12.2 Projected Profit & Loss (3 years)

Particulars	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3
Peak-hour slot bookings (evenings, weekends)	96,00,000	1,12,00,000	1,24,00,000
Off-peak slot bookings (mornings, weekday afternoons)	22,00,000	42,00,000	74,00,000
Corporate leagues & tournaments	24,00,000	38,00,000	56,00,000
Academy & school block hire	18,00,000	32,00,000	48,00,000
F&B, equipment hire & ancillary	16,00,000	24,00,000	34,00,000
Memberships & season passes	12,00,000	22,00,000	34,00,000
Total revenue	1,88,00,000	2,70,00,000	3,70,00,000
Land lease / rent	48,00,000	50,00,000	54,00,000
Salaries (attendants, ground, front office, F&B, security, admin)	34,00,000	46,00,000	62,00,000
Electricity (floodlights) & utilities	22,00,000	30,00,000	40,00,000
Marketing & aggregator commissions	16,00,000	24,00,000	30,00,000
Surface maintenance & resurfacing reserve	14,00,000	18,00,000	24,00,000
Repairs, security systems & facility upkeep	8,00,000	11,00,000	15,00,000
F&B cost of goods	8,00,000	12,00,000	17,00,000
Insurance, licences & compliance	4,00,000	6,00,000	8,00,000
Depreciation, interest & other	26,00,000	29,00,000	32,00,000

Total expenses	1,80,00,000	2,26,00,000	2,82,00,000
Net profit before tax	8,00,000	44,00,000	88,00,000
Net margin	4.3%	16.3%	23.8%
OFF-PEAK UTILISATION — the whole business	14%	29%	46%
Peak utilisation — <i>capped from the start</i>	88%	92%	94%
Blended annual utilisation	34%	47%	61%
REVENUE PER SQ FT PER YEAR (₹) — the land-yield frame	385	553	758
Direct-booking share of PEAK slots	74%	85%	92%
Aggregator commission as % of revenue — <i>falling while platform volume grows</i>	5.8%	4.6%	3.7%
Advance payment on booking / No-show & late-cancellation rate	62% / 11.4%	91% / 5.2%	100% / 2.8%
Resurfacing reserve funded (% of requirement)	100%	100%	100%
Recurring group bookings (same slot weekly)	46	88	152
Peak revenue as % of total — <i>falls because off-peak grew</i>	51.1%	41.5%	33.5%
Surface-related injuries reported / Noise complaints received	9 / 14	5 / 6	3 / 3

12.3 Unit economics & break-even

- **Off-peak utilisation is the entire margin story.** Rent, salaries, security and lighting infrastructure are paid regardless — **an off-peak hour sold contributes almost its full rate, because the marginal cost is roughly the electricity.** 14% → 46% is what takes net margin from 4.3% to 23.8%.
- **Peak revenue is capped and should be understood as such.** It grows only 29% across three years while off-peak grows 236% — **a promoter modelling growth on peak-rate increases is modelling a business that cannot grow.**
- **Revenue per square foot per year is the honest frame** — ₹385 → ₹758 — because this is a land-yield business, and the number should be compared against the alternative uses of that land rather than against other sports businesses.
- **Advance payment is the only working control on no-shows,** taking them from 11.4% to 2.8% — and a no-show at peak is an irrecoverable loss, since the hour cannot be resold at eight in the evening.
- **Break-even:** Year 1, thinly. **The operating leverage is severe in both directions — this business is excellent at 61% blended utilisation and unviable at 30%,** with very little in between.

12.4 Projected Cash Flow — Year 1 (quarterly, illustrative)

Particulars (₹)	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Opening balance	21,00,000	19,00,000	19,00,000	22,00,000
Collections	42,00,000	44,00,000	48,00,000	48,00,000
Rent, salaries, electricity, marketing & overheads	44,00,000	44,00,000	45,00,000	45,00,000
Closing balance	19,00,000	19,00,000	22,00,000	25,00,000

Cash collection is immediate and there are no receivables, so the entire cash risk sits in the rigidity of the cost base. Rent, the loan instalment, security and the core attendant roster are identical in a monsoon month with 40% of normal bookings and a dry October with full ones — and unlike most businesses in this library, there is nothing to reduce when revenue falls, because the facility must remain open, lit and staffed to sell any hours at all. Three disciplines follow. Fund the monsoon deliberately from the dry months, since in much of India several weeks of outdoor play are simply lost each year and a facility discovering this in its first July has mismanaged a predictable event. Keep the resurfacing reserve segregated and untouched — it is the most tempting money in the business precisely because nothing appears to go wrong when it is spent, until the surface fails and the replacement is unaffordable. And treat electricity as the variable it actually is: floodlighting is the second-largest controllable cost and rises with the very utilisation the business is pursuing, so off-peak daylight hours carry structurally better contribution than evening hours at the same rate — a point that argues for morning programming even more strongly than the headline utilisation figure suggests.

12.5 Key Performance Indicators to Monitor

- **Capacity: off-peak and peak utilisation separately;** blended annual utilisation; **revenue per square foot per year;** slot yield by time band.
- **Channel: direct-booking share of peak;** aggregator commission as % of revenue; platform-originated off-peak volume.
- **Reliability: advance payment coverage;** no-show and late-cancellation rate; recurring group bookings retained; on-time slot starts.
- **Asset & compliance: resurfacing reserve funded vs requirement;** surface condition inspections; **surface-related injuries;** noise complaints and curfew adherence; lease tenure remaining.

13. Funding Requirement & Bankability

Total ask: ₹62 lakh term loan plus ₹15 lakh working-capital finance against ₹58 lakh promoter contribution. Four points, and the first is decisive. Roughly ₹90 lakh of the capital — surface, floodlighting, fencing and site development — is immovable improvement to land the operator does not own, with negligible recoverable value. This is the same exposure the academy plan carried, in a more extreme form: a lender is financing an asset that cannot be repossessed and cannot be relocated, which makes lease tenure the central credit question — and a loan tenor longer than the lease term is a structural mismatch, not a documentation detail. Second, the metric to underwrite is off-peak utilisation, since peak is capped by the hours available and a facility at 90% peak and 15% off-peak has already reached its revenue ceiling. Third, ask whether the resurfacing reserve exists and is segregated — an operator without one is reporting a profit that includes a deferred capital liability. Fourth, ask about the land's story: why is it available at this rent, what does the owner intend, and what happens at renewal. In this industry the answer is usually that the land is interim-use, and a plan that has not priced that in is underwriting the wrong risk.

13.1 Funding utilisation

Use of funds	₹	% of total
Turf surface, sub-base & installation	52,00,000	38.5%
Floodlighting, fencing & netting	24,00,000	17.8%
Deposits & advance lease	22,00,000	16.3%

Site development (drainage, levelling, access)	14,00,000	10.4%
Changing rooms, seating & F&B setup	12,00,000	8.9%
Working capital	6,00,000	4.4%
Technology (booking system, access, lighting control)	3,00,000	2.2%
Licences, insurance & launch	2,00,000	1.5%
Total	1,35,00,000	100%

14. Risk Analysis & Mitigation

Risk	Mitigation
Land economics that never close	At market commercial rent in most Indian metros a turf simply does not work — which is why so many sit on land that could not be monetised otherwise: beneath high-tension corridors, awaiting redevelopment, flood-prone, or litigation-blocked. THIS IS THE STRUCTURAL BASIS OF THE INDIAN TURF INDUSTRY, and a promoter who has not understood it will underwrite a site that cannot pay for itself. Model revenue per sq ft against the rent before anything else
Tenure that is short by design	The land is affordable precisely because its owner expects to take it back — so a five-year payback on a three-year lease is not a plan, it is a hope. Negotiate revenue-share or longer term with a break clause rather than the lowest rent, since the cheapest rent is usually attached to the least secure tenure, and the improvements do not travel
Peak treated as the growth path	Peak runs 88% from month one and grows only 29% over three years while off-peak grows 236% — a promoter modelling growth on peak-rate increases is modelling a business that cannot grow. Off-peak utilisation 14% → 46% is where the margin is
Uniform pricing	A facility charging Tuesday-morning rates equal to Saturday-evening rates will sell the Saturday and never the Tuesday. Steep off-peak discounting is not margin erosion — the marginal cost of an empty hour is roughly the electricity, and an hour at 40% of peak contributes 40% more than an hour sold at nothing
Handing peak inventory to aggregators	Platforms genuinely add value off-peak (an off-peak hour at 20% commission beats an off-peak hour sold to nobody) and almost none at peak, where paying 15-25% for a booking that would have happened anyway is pure margin donation. Asymmetric by design: aggressive off-peak listing, peak withheld (direct peak share 74% → 92%)
Losing recurring groups	Eighteen colleagues at the same Wednesday slot for two years are not price-sensitive and will absorb a rate rise rather than reorganise their week — and facilities lose them in exactly one way: the group arrives to find their slot given away, and having been displaced once they book elsewhere permanently. Ring-fence recurring slots absolutely (46 → 152)
Surface life ignored	Turf lasts roughly 5–8 years under Indian sun and heavy use, and replacement is a capital event, not a repair. A facility that does not accrue monthly is reporting profits it will have to hand back , then choosing between an unaffordable resurfacing and a deteriorating surface that drives players away and causes injuries. Reserve funded at 100%, segregated and untouched — the most tempting money in the business precisely because nothing appears to go wrong when it is spent

Noise & floodlight enforcement	The commonest way turfs are shut down in India, ahead of every commercial cause — floodlights and shouting until eleven in a residential area escalate to the municipality. Voluntary curfew, directional lighting, parking discipline, resident-association relationship; reacting after the first notice costs the operating hours that make the business work
No-shows	A no-show at peak is irrecoverable — the hour cannot be resold at eight in the evening . Advance payment 62% → 100%; no-shows 11.4% → 2.8%
Monsoon & fixed costs	Rent, instalment, security and the attendant roster are identical in a 40%-booking monsoon month and a full October, and there is nothing to reduce, because the facility must stay open, lit and staffed to sell any hours at all. Fund the monsoon deliberately from the dry months

15. SWOT Analysis

Strengths Immediate cash collection with no receivables; severe operating leverage once off-peak fills — an empty hour's marginal cost is roughly the electricity ; recurring groups are genuinely price-insensitive; peak demand exceeds supply in most urban catchments; F&B margin on footfall already present; simple operations with no professional-qualification dependency.	Weaknesses ₹90 lakh of immovable improvement on land the operator does not own; demand confined to ~35 of 100 operating hours ; the product is a commodity with zero switching cost; tenure short by design ; fixed costs that cannot flex in monsoon; surface is a depreciating consumable most operators fail to reserve for.
Opportunities School and academy block hire filling the dead weekday hours — the academy's programme hours are the turf's empty ones, making the two natural partners; corporate leagues; morning fitness, women's and senior groups; membership models locking recurring slots; multi-site expansion once site-selection discipline is proven.	Threats New turfs opening within the same drive-time; aggregators capturing the booking relationship and raising take rates; loss of land at lease renewal or redevelopment ; municipal noise and lighting enforcement; electricity tariff increases against a floodlight-dependent model; monsoon severity.

16. Recommended AiSevak Tools for This Business

This turf and sports facility would use AiSevak's Sports and Facility vertical tools in operations:

- **Capacity: peak/off-peak utilisation dashboards by time band**, slot yield analysis, **revenue-per-square-foot tracking**, dynamic off-peak pricing.
- **Channel: direct vs aggregator booking split with peak-inventory withholding**, commission tracking, platform-originated off-peak volume.
- **Reliability: advance-payment enforcement, no-show and cancellation register, recurring-slot ring-fencing with reallocation lock.**
- **Asset: resurfacing reserve accrual and segregation tracking**, surface inspection schedule, injury register, floodlight maintenance and electrical certification.
- **Compliance: noise-curfew adherence log, complaint register, lease tenure and renewal calendar.**

17. Key Assumptions & Notes

- Turf & sports facility: bookable artificial-turf pitches and courts sold by the hour, with corporate leagues, academy and school block hire, memberships and F&B.
- **△ THE PURE CAPACITY BUSINESS OF THE VERTICAL — IT OWNS NOTHING BUT HOURS.** No coaching, no curriculum, no relationship and no product beyond the slot: **A SEVEN O'CLOCK SATURDAY PITCH IS A SEVEN O'CLOCK SATURDAY PITCH, AND THE CUSTOMER CAN GET ONE FROM ANY FACILITY WITHIN A FIFTEEN-MINUTE DRIVE** → everything reduces to **how many of the available hours are sold, and at what rate**. Also **THE MOST EXTREME PEAK/OFF-PEAK BUSINESS IN THE LIBRARY** and the sharpest test of the convention sports-academy established: demand concentrates into **weekday evenings 7-11pm plus weekends — roughly THIRTY-FIVE of a hundred operating hours a week**, with **PEAK AT 88% FROM THE FIRST MONTH AND INCAPABLE OF GROWTH, SO EVERY POINT OF MARGIN IMPROVEMENT COMES FROM HOURS NOBODY CURRENTLY WANTS** (off-peak 14%→29%→46%, blended 34%→61%); useful consequence — **PEAK REVENUE FALLS AS A SHARE FROM 51% TO 34% NOT BECAUSE PEAK WEAKENED BUT BECAUSE THE BUSINESS FINALLY GREW SOMEWHERE ELSE**, and **peak grows only 29% across three years while off-peak grows 236%: A PROMOTER MODELLING GROWTH ON PEAK-RATE INCREASES IS MODELLING A BUSINESS THAT CANNOT GROW.**
- **THE HONEST FRAMING A PROMOTER NEEDS BEFORE ANYTHING ELSE: THESE ARE REAL-ESTATE ECONOMICS WEARING A SPORTS BADGE.** Land cost, rent or instalment, and utilisation are the only three variables that decide the outcome — **BRANDING, COMMUNITY AND COACHING PARTNERSHIPS ARE DECORATIONS ON A YIELD CALCULATION** — so the correct metric is **REVENUE PER SQUARE FOOT PER YEAR (₹385→₹553→₹758), NOT BOOKINGS**, and it should be compared against **ALTERNATIVE USES OF THAT LAND** rather than against **other sports businesses**. Which produces the fact the industry runs on and rarely states: **AT MARKET COMMERCIAL RENT IN MOST INDIAN METROS A TURF SIMPLY DOES NOT WORK — WHICH IS WHY SO MANY OPERATE ON LAND THE OWNER COULD NOT OTHERWISE MONETISE: BENEATH HIGH-TENSION TRANSMISSION CORRIDORS WHERE CONSTRUCTION IS PROHIBITED, PLOTS HELD FOR REDEVELOPMENT WHERE THE OWNER WANTS INTERIM INCOME, LOW-LYING OR FLOOD-PRONE GROUND, INSTITUTIONAL LAND LET INFORMALLY, OR SITES WHERE LITIGATION PREVENTS BUILDING. THIS IS NOT A MARGINAL OBSERVATION — IT IS THE STRUCTURAL BASIS OF THE INDIAN TURF INDUSTRY, AND A PROMOTER WHO HAS NOT UNDERSTOOD IT WILL UNDERWRITE A SITE THAT CANNOT PAY FOR ITSELF** → corollary to plan for rather than discover: **TENURE IS SHORT AND PRECARIOUS BY DESIGN, BECAUSE THE LAND IS CHEAP PRECISELY BECAUSE ITS OWNER EXPECTS TO TAKE IT BACK — A FIVE-YEAR PAYBACK ON A THREE-YEAR LEASE IS NOT A PLAN, IT IS A HOPE**; and **negotiate revenue-share or longer term with a break clause rather than the LOWEST RENT, since THE CHEAPEST RENT IS USUALLY ATTACHED TO THE LEAST SECURE TENURE, AND THE IMPROVEMENTS DO NOT TRAVEL.**
- **AGGREGATOR PLATFORMS PRESENT THE DISINTERMEDIATION PROBLEM FROM pet-services-marketplace ARRIVING FROM THE OTHER SIDE — HERE THE FACILITY IS THE PROVIDER BEING INTERMEDIATED, WHICH CHANGES THE CORRECT ANSWER ENTIRELY.** Platforms genuinely add value at off-peak (reaching casual players who would never have found the facility — **AN OFF-PEAK HOUR SOLD AT 20% COMMISSION IS INFINITELY BETTER THAN AN OFF-PEAK HOUR SOLD TO NOBODY**) and almost none at peak, where **THE EIGHT O'CLOCK SATURDAY SLOT SELLS ITSELF AND PAYING A PLATFORM 15-25% FOR A BOOKING THAT WOULD HAVE HAPPENED ANYWAY IS PURE MARGIN DONATION** → discipline is **ASYMMETRIC BY DESIGN: platforms used AGGRESSIVELY for off-peak inventory and WITHHELD from peak** (direct peak share 74%→85%→92%, aggregator commission falling 5.8%→3.7% of revenue *while platform-originated off-peak volume grows*); failure mode to avoid is the convenient one — **LISTING ALL INVENTORY BECAUSE IT IS EASIER, WHICH TRAINS REGULAR CUSTOMERS TO BOOK THROUGH A PLATFORM THAT THEN OWNS THE RELATIONSHIP AND CAN RAISE ITS TAKE AT WILL.**

- **BECAUSE THE SLOT IS A COMMODITY, THE ONLY DURABLE CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIP IS THE RECURRING GROUP — AND PROTECTING IT IS WORTH MORE THAN ANY MARKETING:** eighteen colleagues who have played at eight on Wednesday for two years are **NOT PRICE-SENSITIVE, DO NOT COMPARE FACILITIES, AND WILL ABSORB A RATE INCREASE RATHER THAN REORGANISE THEIR WEEK**, while the same eighteen booking casually are entirely price-led → **THE RECURRING SLOT MUST BE GENUINELY RING-FENCED: never released to a higher-paying one-off, never moved for a tournament, never lost to a platform's inventory system — BECAUSE FACILITIES LOSE THESE GROUPS IN EXACTLY ONE WAY: THE GROUP ARRIVES TO FIND THEIR SLOT GIVEN AWAY, AND HAVING BEEN DISPLACED ONCE THEY BOOK ELSEWHERE PERMANENTLY** (46→88→152 recurring bookings; **the discipline that produces it is simply NEVER TAKING THE BETTER OFFER FOR A SLOT THAT ALREADY BELONGS TO SOMEONE**). Pricing error to avoid: **UNIFORM HOURLY RATES — a facility charging the same for Tuesday morning as Saturday evening WILL SELL THE SATURDAY AND NEVER THE TUESDAY, because the off-peak buyer is entirely PRICE-ELASTIC and the peak buyer is not; STEEP OFF-PEAK DISCOUNTING IS NOT MARGIN EROSION, SINCE THE MARGINAL COST OF AN OTHERWISE-EMPTY HOUR IS CLOSE TO THE ELECTRICITY BILL AND AN HOUR SOLD AT 40% OF PEAK RATE CONTRIBUTES 40% MORE THAN AN HOUR SOLD AT NOTHING.**
- **TWO OPERATIONAL REALITIES ROUTINELY LEFT OUT OF TURF BUSINESS PLANS, BOTH EXPENSIVE. (1) THE SURFACE IS A CONSUMABLE WITH A DEFINED LIFE —** artificial turf under Indian sun and heavy daily use lasts roughly **FIVE TO EIGHT YEARS** before infill degradation, fibre wear and seam failure make it unpleasant and unsafe, and **REPLACEMENT IS A SUBSTANTIAL CAPITAL EVENT, NOT A REPAIR** → a facility not accruing monthly is **REPORTING PROFITS IT WILL HAVE TO HAND BACK**, then choosing between **an unaffordable resurfacing and a deteriorating surface that drives players away and causes injuries**; reserve funded at **100% of requirement, treated as a COST OF TRADING** rather than an optional provision, and kept **SEGREGATED AND UNTOUCHED — the most tempting money in the business precisely because NOTHING APPEARS TO GO WRONG WHEN IT IS SPENT.** (2) **THE NEIGHBOURS —** floodlights and eighteen shouting adults until eleven at night in what is usually a residential area **GENERATES COMPLAINTS THAT ESCALATE TO THE MUNICIPALITY, AND NOISE AND LIGHTING ENFORCEMENT IS THE COMMONEST WAY TURFS ARE SHUT DOWN IN INDIA, AHEAD OF EVERY COMMERCIAL CAUSE** → a voluntary curfew, directional lighting, parking discipline and a resident-association relationship cost very little, while **REACTING AFTER THE FIRST NOTICE COSTS THE OPERATING HOURS THAT MAKE THE BUSINESS WORK** (complaints 14→6→3).
- Regulatory: **NO NATIONAL STANDARD EXISTS FOR COMMERCIAL SPORTS FACILITIES IN INDIA — the FIFTH self-regulated business in this library**; binding items are **land use and zoning (much turf sits on land whose permitted use is NOT commercial recreation, and an operation without it is exposed to CLOSURE rather than penalty)**, municipal trade licence and building permissions, **noise and floodlight-timing regulation**, FSSAI where food is served, **public liability and personal-accident cover since TURF INJURIES ARE FREQUENT AND WORN SURFACE, INADEQUATE INFILL OR A HARD SUB-BASE ARE FORESEEABLE CAUSES RATHER THAN ACCIDENTS**, and electrical safety certification for high-mast lighting. Cash: collection is immediate with no receivables, so **THE ENTIRE CASH RISK SITS IN THE RIGIDITY OF THE COST BASE — RENT, THE LOAN INSTALMENT, SECURITY AND THE CORE ATTENDANT ROSTER ARE IDENTICAL IN A MONSOON MONTH AT 40% OF NORMAL BOOKINGS AND A DRY OCTOBER AT FULL ONES, AND UNLIKE MOST BUSINESSES IN THIS LIBRARY THERE IS NOTHING TO REDUCE WHEN REVENUE FALLS, BECAUSE THE FACILITY MUST REMAIN OPEN, LIT AND STAFFED TO SELL ANY HOURS AT ALL** → fund the monsoon deliberately from the dry months, keep the resurfacing reserve segregated, and **treat ELECTRICITY as the variable it actually is: floodlighting is the second-largest controllable cost and RISES WITH THE VERY UTILISATION THE BUSINESS IS PURSUING, so OFF-PEAK DAYLIGHT HOURS CARRY STRUCTURALLY BETTER CONTRIBUTION THAN EVENING HOURS AT THE SAME RATE — a point that argues for MORNING programming even more strongly than the headline utilisation figure suggests.** Note the natural partnership: **THE ACADEMY'S SCHOOL-PROGRAMME HOURS ARE THE TURF'S**

DEAD ONES, MAKING THESE TWO BUSINESSES NATURAL PARTNERS RATHER THAN COMPETITORS (academy & school block hire 9.6%→13.0% of revenue). Also **advance payment is the only working control on no-shows (62%→100%, no-shows 11.4%→2.8%), and A NO-SHOW AT PEAK IS IRRECOVERABLE SINCE THE HOUR CANNOT BE RESOLD AT EIGHT IN THE EVENING;** and **operating leverage is severe IN BOTH DIRECTIONS — this business is excellent at 61% blended utilisation and unviable at 30%, WITH VERY LITTLE IN BETWEEN.** Lender note: **ROUGHLY ₹90 LAKH OF THE CAPITAL (SURFACE, FLOODLIGHTING, FENCING, SITE DEVELOPMENT) IS IMMOVABLE IMPROVEMENT TO LAND THE OPERATOR DOES NOT OWN, WITH NEGLIGIBLE RECOVERABLE VALUE — the same exposure sports-academy carried, IN A MORE EXTREME FORM: A LENDER IS FINANCING AN ASSET THAT CANNOT BE REPOSSESSED AND CANNOT BE RELOCATED, WHICH MAKES LEASE TENURE THE CENTRAL CREDIT QUESTION AND A LOAN TENOR LONGER THAN THE LEASE TERM A STRUCTURAL MISMATCH, NOT A DOCUMENTATION DETAIL;** underwrite **OFF-PEAK UTILISATION** since **A FACILITY AT 90% PEAK AND 15% OFF-PEAK HAS ALREADY REACHED ITS REVENUE CEILING;** ask whether the **resurfacing reserve EXISTS AND IS SEGREGATED,** because an operator without one is reporting a profit that **INCLUDES A DEFERRED CAPITAL LIABILITY;** and ask about the **LAND'S STORY — why is it available at this rent, what does the owner intend, what happens at renewal — because IN THIS INDUSTRY THE ANSWER IS USUALLY THAT THE LAND IS INTERIM-USE, AND A PLAN THAT HAS NOT PRICED THAT IN IS UNDERWRITING THE WRONG RISK.** ₹1.35cr, blended utilisation 34%→61%, rev 1.88→3.7cr, Y1 ₹8L → Y3 ₹88L. Figures illustrative, exclude GST.

► **Use these tools now — free on AiSevak**

Every tool referenced in this plan is available on aisevak.in. Open the [Sports, Fitness & Recreation Businesses toolkit](#) to browse and use them all at <https://aisevak.in/verticals/sports> — or go straight to any specific tool at <https://aisevak.in/service/<tool-name>>. No signup needed to explore; each tool guides you step by step.

Prepared by AiSevak.in — a product of ABL Digital Technologies. AI-powered business services for India. This is AI-assisted guidance; figures are illustrative and not a guarantee of results. Verify all numbers, licences and regulatory requirements with a qualified professional before relying on this plan for binding decisions. © 2026 ABL Digital Technologies Private Limited.